A worldwide depression struck countries with commercialise economies at the end of the 1920s. Although the Great Low pressure was relatively mild in some countries, it was severe in others, particularly in the United States, where, at its nadir in 1933, 25 per centum of every last workers and 37 percent of all nonfarm workers were completely idle. Some people starved; many others lost their farms and homes. Homeless vagabonds sneaked aboard the cargo trains that crossed the commonwealth. Dispossessed cotton farmers, the "Okies," stuffed their possessions into tatterdemalion Theoretical account Ts and migrated to California in the false hope that the posters about plentiful jobs were true. Although the U.S. thriftiness began to recover in the second draw of 1933, the recovery largely stalled for almost of 1934 and 1935. A more vigorous recovery commenced in late 1935 and continued into 1937, when a new depression occurred. The Ground thriftiness had sooner or later to fully recover from the Bully Depression when the United States was drawn into Mankind War II in December 1941. Because of this agonizingly slow recovery, the entire decade of the 1930s in the United States is often referred to atomic number 3 the Great Depression.

The Large Depression is often named a "defining moment" in the twentieth-century history of the US. Its most indissoluble effect was a transformation of the theatrical role of the federal government in the thriftiness. The long contraction and painfully drawn-out recovery light-emitting diode many in the American population to accept and even bespeak a vastly expanded role for government activity, though most businesses resented the growing Federal soldier control of their activities. The federal government took over responsibility for the elderly population with the creation of Social Security and gave the involuntarily dismissed unemployment recompense. The Wagner Act dramatically altered labor negotiations betwixt employers and employees by promoting unions and acting as an arbiter to assure "fair" labor contract negotiations. All of this required an increase in the size of the federal government. During the 1920s, on that point were, on average, about 553,000 paid civilian employees of the federal governing. By 1939 there were 953,891 reply-paid noncombatant employees, and thither were 1,042,420 in 1940. In 1928 and 1929, federal receipts on the body budget (the body budget excludes any amounts conventional for Oregon spent from trust funds and whatsoever amounts borrowed or accustomed pay down the debt) averaged 3.80 percent of GNP while expenditures averaged 3.04 pct of GNP. In 1939, federal receipts were 5.50 percent of GNP, while federal expenditures had tripled to 9.77 percent of GNP. These figures provide an indication of the vast expansion of the federal government's role during the depressed 1930s.

The Capital Slump also transformed economical thinking. Because many economists and others blame the low pressure on inadequate demand, the Keynesian view that government could and should stabilize require to prevent future depressions became the governing view in the economics profession for leastwise the next forty years. Although an increasing number of economists have refer incertitude this scene, the general in the public eye still accepts it.

Interestingly, given the importance of the Great Depression in the development of economic thinking and scheme policy, economists do not completely agree on what caused it. Recent inquiry away Peter Temin, Barry Eichengreen, David Glasner, Ben Bernanke, and others has led to an emergent consensus on wherefore the contraction began in 1928 and 1929. There is less accord on wherefore the contraction phase was longer and more severe in around countries and wherefore the depression lasted so long in or s countries, particularly the United States.

The Great Great Depression that began at the finish of the 1920s was a worldwide phenomenon. By 1928, Germany, Federative Republic of Brazil, and the economies of Southeast Asia were depressed. Away early 1929, the economies of Poland, Argentina, and Canada were contracting, and the U.S. economy followed in the middle of 1929. As Temin, Eichengreen, and others experience shown, the larger constituent that tied these countries put together was the multinational chromatic standard.

By 1914, most developed countries had adopted the chromatic standard with a fixed exchange order between the national currency and gold—and therefore between nationalistic currencies. In First World War, European nations went off the gilt standard to mark money, and the resulting price inflation drove large amounts of the human beings's gold to banks in the United States. The US remained on the gold standard without altering the gold value of the dollar. Investors and others who held gold sent their gold to the United States, where gilded maintained its value as a uninjured and sound investment. At the end of World Warfare I, a couple of countries, most notably the United States government, continuing happening the Au standard while others temporarily adopted drifting change rates. The universe's international finance center had shifted from London to New York, and the British were anxious to regain their old status. Some countries committed to return to the gold standard with devalued currencies, while others followed the British conduct and aimed to paying back to gold at prewar interchange rates.

This was not viable, however. Overmuch money had been created during the war to allow a return to the gold standard without either large currency devaluations or price deflations. In addition, the U.S. gold stock had double to or so 40 percent of the world's monetary gold. In that respect simply was not adequate monetary gold in the rest of the cosmos to support the countries' currencies at the existent exchange rates. As a result, the leading nations established a gold substitution system whereby the governments of the United States and Important Britain would be willing, at all times, to redeem the dollar and the British pound for gold, and other countries would hold much of their international reserves in Brits pounds or U.S. dollars.

The demand for gold increased as countries returned to the gold standardized. Because the franc was undervalued when France returned to the gilt criterion in June 1928, France began to receive gold inflows. The undervalued franc made French exports less expensive in foreign countries' currencies and successful foreign imports into France more expensive in francs. A French exports blush wine and French imports fell, their international accounts were balanced by gold shipped to France. France's government, reverse to the tenets of the Au normal, did not utilise these inflows to expand its money supply. In 1928, the Federal Reserve System raised its discount rate—that is, the order it charged along loans to member banks—in order to raise worry rates in the US, which would stem the outflow of American English Au and moisten the booming stock food market. As a resultant, the United States began to receive shipments of gold. Away 1929, As countries around the world befuddled metallic to Jacques Anatole Francois Thibault and the USA, these countries' governments initiated deflationary policies to shank their gold outflows and remain on the gold standard. These deflationary policies were fashioned to restrict economic bodily function and reduce price levels, and that is exactly what they did. Therefore began the universal Great Depression.

The onset of the muscular contraction led to the end of the stockmarket windfall and the crash in late October 1929. However, the line of descent market tumble did not cause the depression; nor can IT explain the extraordinary duration and profoundness of the Dry land condensation. In about countries, such as Britain, France, Canada, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries, the depression was little severe and shorter, often ending by 1931. Those countries did not get the banking and commercial enterprise crises that the United States did, and most left the Au standard sooner than the Undivided States did. In the US Government, in contrast, the contraction continued for quaternary age from the summer of 1929 through the first quarter of 1933. During that time real GNP fell 30.5 percentage, indiscriminate prices fly 30.8 percent, and consumer prices fell 24.4 percent.

In preceding depressions, engage rates typically barbarous 9-10 percent during a one- to 2-year contraction; these falling wages made it possible for more workers than otherwise to keep their jobs. Yet, in the Great Depression, manufacturing firms unbroken wage rates nearly constant into 1931, something commentators considered rather unusual. With falling prices and unvarying wage rates, real hourly wages rose sharply in 1930 and 1931. Though some spreading of work did occur, firms in the main laid off workers. American Samoa a result, unemployment began to surge amid plummeting production, particularly in the durable manufacturing sphere, where production fell 36 percentage between the end of 1929 and the end of 1930 and then inhumane another 36 percent between the end of 1930 and the end of 1931.

Why had payoff not fallen every bit they had in previous contractions? One reason was that President Herbert Hoover prevented them from decreasing. (See Hoover's Worldly Policies.) He had been appalled by the wage rate cuts in the 1920-1921 slump and had preached a "high wage" policy throughout the 1920s. By the late 1920s, many business and undertaking leaders and academic economists believed that policies to sustain remuneration rates high would maintain workers' level of buying, providing the "steadier" markets necessary to thwart economic contractions. When President Hoover organized conferences in December 1929 to urge business, industrial, and labor leaders to hold the line on wage rates and dividends, he found a willing audience. The highly preventative Smoot-Hawley Duty, passed in middle-1930, was supposed to allow for protection from lour-cost imports for firms that maintained engage rates. Gum olibanum, it was non until recovered into 1931 that the steadily deteriorating lin conditions led the boards of directors of a number of large firms to begin important wage plac cuts, often over the protest of the firms' top executives, World Health Organization had committed to maintain wage rates.

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff was another piece of William Henry Hoover's strategy. Though on that point was not a gross call for duty increases, Hoover projected it in 1929 as a means of aiding farmers. He quickly lost control of the bill and it all over up protecting American businesses in general with a lot less real protection for farmers. Many of the duty increases in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff were quite sizeable; for example, the duty on Canadian hard winter wheat berry rose 40 percent, and that along scientific glass instruments rose from 65 percent to 85 percent. Overall on nonexempt imports the tariff rate rose from 40.1 percent to 53.21 pct. There was some explicit retaliation for the North American country tariff increases so much as Espana's Wais Tariff. Some other countries' planned tariff increases were encouraged and probably expedited by the action of the United States.

Firms besides heeded President Hoover's call to rent out the contraction fall on profits rather than along dividends. Dividends in 1930 were almost as large as in 1929, simply undistributed corporate profits plummeted from $2.8 billion in 1929 to −$2.6 billion in 1930. (These numbers game may sound diminutive, but compared with the 1929 U.S. GNP of $103.1 billion, they were substantial.) The value of firms' securities fell sharply, leading to a significant deterioration in the portfolios of Banks. As conditions worsened and banks' losses increased, deposit runs and bank failures accrued. The first star bank runs and failures occurred in the Southeast in Nov 1930; these were followed by more runs and failures in December. There was another flurry of bank runs and bank failures in the late spring and primitive summer of 1931. After Majuscule Britain left the gold regular in September 1931, the Federal Appropriate Organization initiated comparatively large increases in the bank discount to stem the gold outflow. Overseas investors in nations still on the gold common expected the United States to either devalue the dollar or go away the aureate standard as Great UK had done. The result would be that the dollars they held, or their dollar-denominated securities, would be worth less. To preclude this they sold dollars to obtain gold from the US. The Fed's policy moves gave overseas investors confidence that the United States would respect its gold commitment. The rise in American interest rates also ready-made IT Thomas More pricy to sell North American country assets for dollars to save in gold. The resulting jump in worry rates caused not only more business organisatio failures, but also a intense rise in bank failures. In the late spring and early summer of 1932, the Federal Reserve Scheme at last undertook give market purchases, bringing some signs of relief and possible convalescence to the beleaguered American saving.

Hoover's commercial enterprise policy accelerated the declension. In December 1929, as a means of demonstrating the administration's faith in the economy, Vacuum-clean had reduced wholly 1929 income tax rates past 1 percent because of the continuing budget surpluses. By 1930 the surplus had turned into a shortfall that grew rapidly as the economy contracted. By the goal of 1931 Herbert Clark Hoover had definite to recommend a large tax increase in an set about to Libra the Balance the budget; Intercourse approved the tax growth in 1932. Personal exemptions were reduced acutely to increase the number of taxpayers, and rates were sharply increased. The lowest marginal rate rose from 1.125 percentage to 4.0 percentage, and the top marginal rate rose from 25 percent happening taxable income in excess of $100,000 to 63 pct on assessable income in overabundance of $1 billion as the rates were made a good deal more progressive. We now understand that such a huge tax step-up does non elevat recovery during a muscular contraction. Past reducing households' disposable income, it led to a reducing in house spending and a further contraction in economic activity.

The Federal's expansionary monetary insurance policy ended in the early summertime of 1932. After his election in November 1932, President-elect Roosevelt refused to abstract his policies or endorse Hoover's, and he refused to deny that he would devaluate the dollar against gold after He took office in Exhibit 1933. Bank runs and bank failures resumed with a retribution, and American dollars began to beryllium saved for Au American Samoa the gold outflow resumed. As financial conditions worsened in January and February 1933, state governments began declaring banking holidays, closing down states' entire financial sectors. Roosevelt's nationalist banking holiday stopped the runs and banking failures and finally ended the contraction.

Between 1929 and 1933, 10,763 of the 24,970 commercial banks in the United States failing. As the public increasingly held more currency and few deposits, and atomic number 3 banks built up their excess militia, the money supply strike down 30.9 percent from its 1929 level. Though the Fed did increase rely reserves, the increases were far too small to stop the drop away in the money add. As businesses saw their lines of credit and money reserves fall with bank closings, and consumers saw their bank deposit wealth bound up in careworn-out bankruptcy minutes, spending fell, worsening the collapse in the Great Depression.

The national banking vacation terminated the protracted banking crisis, began to restore the public's confidence in banks and the economy, and initiated a recovery from April through September 1933. President Roosevelt came into office proposing a New Deal for Americans, but his advisers believed, mistakenly, that excessive contention had led to overproduction, causation the depression. The centerpieces of the Fres Deal were the Rural Accommodation Act (AAA) and the National Recovery Administration (NRA), both of which were aimed at reducing yield and raising payoff and prices. Reduced production, course, is what happens in depressions, and it never ready-made gumption to try to get the nation out of depression by reduc ing production further. In its readiness, the administration apparently did not consider the elementary impossibility of raising altogether real wage rates and every last realistic prices.

The AAA immediately fructify retired to slaughter six million babe pigs and reduce breeding sows to reduce pork production and raise prices. Since cotton cloth plantings were thought to exist excessive, cotton farmers were paid to plow subordinate one-quarter of the forty million demesne of cotton to reduce marketed production to boost prices. Most of the payments went to the landowners, not the tenants, making conditions resolute for tenant farmers. Though landowners were supposed to share the payments with their tenant farmers, they were non legally obligated to brawl so and most did not. As a result, tenant farmers, and especially black tenants, who were more easily discriminated against, received none of the payments and less operating theatre no income from cotton fiber yield after large portions of the browse were plowed low-level. Where opinion was toothless in inducing the many individual farmers to thin production, the federal government intended to mandate production cutbacks and purchase the product to guide it off the market and arouse prices.

The NRA was a vast try out in cartelizing American industry. Code authorities in each industry were set up to determine production and investment, as well as to standardize firm practices and costs. The entire apparatus was aimed at raising prices and reducing, not increasing, output and investiture. As the NRA codes began to take effect in the fall of 1933, they had precisely that effect. The recovery that had seemed so bright in the summer mostly stopped, and in that respect was itsy-bitsy increase in economic bodily function from the fall of 1933 done midsummer 1935. Enforcement of the codes was sporadic, dissension over the codes increased, and, in smaller, many competitive industries, few firms adhered to the codes. The Supreme Court ruled the NRA unconstitutional on May 27, 1935, and the AAA unconstitutional on January 6, 1936. Released from the shackles of the National Rifle Association, American industry began to expand production. By the fall of 1935 a vigorous recovery was under way.

The introduction of the NRA had at first brought approximately a sharp increase in money and real wage rates as firms attempted to comply with the NRA's blanket code. As firms' enthusiasm for the NRA waned, money earnings rates increased little and echt average earnings rates actually fell slimly in 1934 and early 1935. Additionally, many workers decided not to connect independent labor unions. These factors helped the recovery. Unhappy with the lack of wedlock power, however, Senator Robert Wagner, in the summer of 1935, authored the National Labor Dealings Act to control that mating members could force other workers to unite their unions with a hastate majority vote, therefore effectively monopolizing the labor force. Internal dissension and the new Congress of Industrial Organizations' (CIO) ontogeny of strategies to use the new law unbroken labor unions from taking reward of the newfound act until late in 1936. In the first half of 1937, the CIO's massive organizing drives LED to trade union movement union recognition at many large firms. Generally, the new contracts raised hourly wage rates and created overtime wage rates as real hourly labor costs surged.

Several other factors also pushed up real labor costs. Indefinite factor was the new Social Security taxes instituted in 1936 and 1937. Also, Roosevelt had pushed through a new tax connected undistributed corporate profits, expecting this to effort firms to disburse undiversified earnings in dividends. Though some firms did pay out part of the retained net profit in bigger dividends, others, such as the firms in the blade diligence, too paid bonuses and raised wage rates to avoid paid their retained earnings in new taxes. As these three policies came jointly, real hourly labor costs jumped without corresponding increases in demand or prices, and firms responded by reducing production and egg laying off employees.

The second major policy variety was in monetary insurance policy. Following the end of the contraction, Banks, as a precaution against bank runs, had begun to hold large overindulgence militia. Officials at the Federal Reserve System knew that if Banks used a large percentage of those excess reserves to increment lending, the money render would apace expand and price pretentiousness would follow. Their studies suggested that the excess militia were distributed widely across Sir Joseph Banks, and they assumed that these reserves were due to the downhearted level of lend demand. Because banks were not borrowing at the discount window and the Fed had no bonds to sell on the open market, its only tool to reduce excess reserves was the new cardinal of varying appropriate requirements. 'tween August 1, 1936, and Crataegus laevigata 1, 1937, in three stairs, the Fed doubled reserve requirements for altogether classes of member banks, wiping out much of the excess militia, particularly at the larger banks. The banks, burned by their lack of excess militia in the immature 1930s, responded aside beginning to restore the excess reserves, which entailed reduction loans. Within 18 months, excess reserves were almost as rangy as before the reserve requirement increases, and, needs, the stock of money was lower.

Aside June 1937, the recovery—during which the unemployment rate had fallen to 12 percent—was over. Two policies, labor be increases and a contractionary monetary policy, caused the economy to contract further. Although the contraction ended or so June 1938, the ensuing recovery was quite slow. The average rate of unemployment for all of 1938 was 19.1 percent, compared with an norm unemployment rate for whol of 1937 of 14.3 percent. Even in 1940, the unemployment order still averaged 14.6 per centum.

Wherefore was the retrieval from the Great Depression so slow? A number of economists now argue that the NRA and monetary system policy were important factors. Some maintain that Roosevelt's vacillating policies and new federal regulations hindered recovery (Gary Dean Best, Richard Vedder and Lowell Gallaway, and Gary Ernest Thomas Sinton Walton), while others stress monetary factors (Friedman and Anna Schwartz, Christian Saint-Etienne, and Barry Eichengreen). The New Heap's NRA has received much criticism (Gary Dean Best, Gene Smiley, Richard Vedder and Lowell Gallaway, Gary Ernest Walton, and Michael Weinstein). A now damaged account from Alvin Hansen argued that the United States had exhausted its investing opportunities. E. Cary Brown, Larry Peppers, and Lowell Thomas Renaghan emphasize federal fiscal policies that were a drag connected the return to full employment. Michael Bernstein argues that investment problems retarded the recovery because the older established industries could not generate sufficient investiture spell newer, increasing industries had ail obtaining investment funds in the depressed environs. Black lovage Field argues that the uncontrollable housing investment of the 1920s severely rock-bottom housing investiture in the 1930s.

One of the most coherent explanations, which pulls together several of these themes, is what economic historian Robert Higgs calls "authorities uncertainty." According to Higgs, President Theodore Roosevelt's New Deal LED business sector leadership to dubiousness whether the current "regime" of private property rights in their firms' capital and its income stream would be protected. They became less willing, therefore, to invest in assets with long lives. Franklin Roosevelt had first suspended the antitrust laws so that American businesses would cooperate in government-instigated cartels; he then switched to using the antitrust laws to prosecute firms for cooperating. New taxes had been imposed, and some were then removed; acceleratory regulation of businesses had reduced businesses' power to act independently and raise capital; and new legislation had reduced their exemption in hiring and employing labor. Popular opinion surveys of business at the end of the 1930s provided evidence of this government uncertainty. Opinion polls in March and May 1939 asked whether the attitude of the Roosevelt organization toward business sector was delaying recovery, and 54 and 53 percent, respectively, said yes while 26 and 31 percent said no. Cardinal-six percent believed that in ten eld there would follow Sir Thomas More government operate of business while merely 22 percent intellection there would personify less. Sixty-Phoebe percent of executives surveyed thought that the Roosevelt presidential term policies had so affected business confidence that the recovery had been seriously held back. Initially many firms were loth to engage in state of war contracts. The vast majority believed that Roosevelt's administration was powerfully antibusiness, and this discouraged practical cooperation with American capital on rearmament.

It is usually argued that World War II provided the stimulus that brought the American economy verboten of the Nifty Depression. The number of unemployed workers declined by 7,050,000 between 1940 and 1943, but the numeral in military service rose wine by 8,590,000. The step-dow in unemployment tail end be explained by the draft, not by the economic recovery. The rise in real gross national product presents similar problems. Most estimates show declines in real consumption disbursement, which means that consumers were worse off during the war. Business investment vicious during the war. Government spending on the war effort exceeded the expansion in actual Gross national product. These figures are shady, however, because we bang that government estimates of the value of munitions spending, to name one stellar area, were increasingly exaggerated as the war progressed. As a matter of fact, the extensive monetary value controls, rationing, and government control of product render data on Gross national product, consumption, investment, and the price level less significant. How can we shew a pursuant price level when government mandates eliminated the production of most consumer consumer durables? What does the price of, order, petrol mean when it is arbitrarily held at a depleted level and gasoline purchases are rationed to address the shortage created by the Price controls? What does the price of new tires mean when no unused tires are produced for consumers? For consumers, the recovery came with the state of war's end, when they could again buy products that were inaccessible during the war and unaffordable during the 1930s.

Could the Great Depression happen again? It could, but such an event is unlikely because the Federal Reserve Room is unlikely to sit idly past while the money issue falls by third. The wisdom gained in the years since the 1930s probably gives our policymakers enough perceptivity to make decisions that will keep the economy unfashionable of such a major depression.

Further Reading

Bernstein, Michael. The Great Depression: Delayed-action Recovery and Economic Change in America, 1929-1939. Modern York: Cambridge Press, 1987.

Best, Gary Doyen. Pride, Prejudice, and Politics: Roosevelt Versus Recovery, 1933-1938. New House of York: Praeger, 1991.

Bordo, Michael D., Claudia Goldin, and Eugene N. White, eds. The Shaping Moment: The Outstanding Slump and the Land Economy in the Ordinal Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.

Brunette, E. Cary. "Fiscal Policy in the Thirties: A Reappraisal." American Economic Revue 46 (December 1956): 857-879.

Brunner, Karl, ed. The Great Depression Revisited. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.

Cole, Harold L., and Lee E. Ohanian. "New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General Balance Analysis." Diary of Economics 112 (August 2004): 779-816.

Eichengreen, Barry. Golden Fetters: The Au Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939. New York City: Oxford University Pressure, 1992.

Field of operations, Horse parsley J. "Errant Land Developing and the Duration of the Depression in the United States." Journal of Economical History 52 (June 1992): 785-805.

Friedman, Milton, and Anna Jacobson Schwartz. A Monetary Story of the United States, 1867-1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Glasner, Saint David. Free Banking and Monetary See the light. NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Hall, Thomas, and J. David Ferguson. The Great Depression: An International Disaster of Perverse Economic Policies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998.

Hansen, Alvin. Inundated Recovery Beaver State Stagnation? New York: Norton, 1938.

Higgs, Robert. Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Higgs, Robert. "Authorities Uncertainty: Why the Great Depression Lasted Adios and Why Prosperity Returned After the State of war." Independent Review 1 (Spring 1997): 561-590.

Higgs, Robert. "Wartime Successfulness? A Reappraisal of the U.S. Thriftiness in the 1940s." Journal of System Account 52 (Butt o 1992): 41-60.

O'Brien, Anthony Patrick. "A Behavioral Explanation for Nominal Wage Rigidity During the Great Depression." Period of time Journal of Economics 104 (Nov 1989): 719-735.

Peppers, Larry. "Full-Employment Surplus Analysis and Biological science Change: The 1930s." Explorations in Economic History 10 (Wintertime 1973): 197-210.

Renaghan, Thomas. "A New Consider Business Policy in the 1930s." Research in Economic History 11 (1988): 171-183.

Saint-Etienne, Christian. The Great Depression, 1929-1938: Lessons for the 1980s. Stanford University: William Henry Hoover Mental institution Entreat, 1984.

Smiley, Gene. Rethinking the Great Natural depression: A New View of Its Causes and Consequences. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002.

Temin, Peter. Did Medium of exchange Forces Cause the Keen Depression? New York: Norton, 1976.

Temin, Peter. Lessons from the Great Depression. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989.

Temin, Peter. "Socialism and Wages in the Recovery from the Great Depression in the United States and Germany." Journal of Economic Account 50 (June 1990): 297-308.

Temin, Peter, and Barrie Wigmore. "The End of One Larger-than-life Deflation." Explorations in Economic History 27 (October 1990): 483-502.

Vedder, Richard K., and Lowell P. Gallaway. Out of Work: Unemployment and Government in 20th-Century America. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1993.

Walton, Gary M., ed. Regulatory Change in an Standard pressure of Crisis: Stream Implications of the Roosevelt Years. New York: Academic Press, 1979.

Weinstein, Michael. Recovery and Redistribution Under the NIRA. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1980.

Wright, Gavin. "The Economic science of New Deal Disbursement: An Econometric Analysis." Review of Economics and Statistics 56 (February 1974): 30-38.